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In their article, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in 
Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, Professors Turner 
and Redlich ostensibly compare North Carolina’s “open-file” 
criminal discovery with Virginia’s “closed-file” discovery. Based 
on their survey results, they conclude that open-file discovery is 
                                                                                                     
 *  Commonwealth’s Attorney, City of Lynchburg. 
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“a better guarantor of informed decisions and efficient process in 
criminal cases.”1 While we appreciate the authors’ justifiable 
concerns about the relative reliability of criminal convictions 
between Virginia and North Carolina, we must disagree with 
their methodology and, as a result, many of their conclusions.  
Rather than refute line-by-line, I will make a few brief general 
comments on behalf of Virginia’s prosecutors. 
I. Methodology 
A. Perceptions 
Our problem with the article begins with its title. The title of 
the article claims that this is an “empirical” study, which 
connotes that the scientific method was used; yet the body of the 
article proves otherwise. While the authors repeatedly note that 
prosecutors and defense counsel provided vastly different 
answers, they also concede that their “survey focuses on the 
perceptions of those involved in discovery and therefore does not 
directly test the effects of open-file discovery against those of 
more restrictive discovery.”2 In fact, “[p]articularly when it comes 
to defense attorneys, perceptions of what is disclosed may, in 
many situations, be educated guesses.”3 
The fault lies in much of the methodology. While the authors 
include in the appendix the survey given to prosecutors,4 they do 
not include the survey given to defense attorneys. The authors do 
not explain that omission, although they do provide excerpts of 
the defense attorney’s survey in the article. One example is this 
question: “In felony cases, what types of documents does the 
prosecutor turn over either as part of the initial discovery 
package or later, but before a defendant pleads guilty?”5 
                                                                                                     
 1.  Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery 
in Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 286 
(2016). 
 2.  Id. at 315 (emphasis added).  
 3.  Id. at 374 (emphasis added).  
 4.  See id. at 386–99 (outlining the survey questions the authors asked 
prosecutors).  
 5.  Id. at 324.  
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Respondents are limited only to the answers, “Never,” 
“Sometimes,” or “Always.”6 Interestingly, the types of documents 
listed include information that almost never appears in the 
standard felony case, such as statements of non-testifying 
experts.7 In another question, the authors ask defense counsel 
how often prosecutors turn over impeachment evidence in their 
possession and evidence not in their possession but 
“requestable.”8 “Requestable” is not defined. By definition, 
defense counsel would have little to no idea whether such 
evidence even exists and yet 47.5% of the Virginia respondents 
and 33% of the North Carolina respondents claim “Never.”9 
As someone who has been a prosecutor in Virginia for thirty-
two years, it is not hard for me to conclude that most prosecutors 
and defense counsel, regardless of where they practice, have very 
different perceptions from one another about many facets of 
criminal law and procedure. The truth for many of those facets is 
probably somewhere in the middle. Rather than being entitled 
“An Empirical Comparison,” the article should be entitled “A 
Perceptional Comparison.” 
B. Non-Representative Sampling  
There is another more glaring problem with the authors’ 
statistics and one that compounds its reliance on perceptions. 
This problem is their use of a non-representative convenience 
sample,10 which is a form of non-probability sampling.11  
The authors concede that they did not attempt to collect data 
from a representative sample of prosecutors or defense 
                                                                                                     
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. at 332. 
 9.  Id.  
 10.  Professor of Statistics David Freedman warns that “[s]tatistical 
inference from convenience samples is a risky business.” DAVID FREEDMAN, 
STATISTICAL MODELS AND CAUSAL INFERENCE 40 (David Collier et al. eds., 2009).  
 11.  See generally Samuel R. Lucas, An Inconvenient Dataset: Bias and 
Inappropriate Inference in the Multilevel Model, 48 QUALITY & QUANTITY 1619–
49 (2014) (explaining sample design features that are required for unbiased 
estimation of macro-level multilevel model parameters and the use of tools for 
statistical inference). 
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attorneys.12 It appears that the sole qualification that the authors 
sought from a respondent was that the person was willing and 
had the time and ability to complete the survey. 
Indeed, the authors intended that respondents to the survey 
self-select.13 Self-selection is a survey bias that inherently 
produces a non-representative sample and one that exaggerates 
certain perspectives over others.14   
Even worse, the survey also suffers from a unique form of 
convenience sampling called “snowball sampling.”15 Snowball 
sampling is a non-probability sampling technique that is used by 
researchers to identify potential subjects in studies where 
subjects are hard to locate.16 In this case, the authors asked 
elected prosecutors in Virginia who were interested in 
participating to help them identify assistants in their own office 
who would also participate.17 We have no idea what method was 
used, if any, by those elected prosecutors in selecting assistants to 
participate. But why conduct a snowball sample of public 
officials? By definition, we should not be hard to locate. 
C. Low Response Rates 
The authors acknowledge that one of their “methodological 
caveats” was the low response rate.18  For Virginia prosecutors, 
the authors sent out a survey link to the 120 Commonwealth’s 
Attorneys offices, but only thirty-seven offices agreed to 
participate at all.19 185 prosecutors (24% of all Virginia 
prosecutors) began the survey.20 However, for reasons that are 
never explained, only 122 of these completed the survey (16% of 
                                                                                                     
 12.  Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 321. 
 13.  Id.  
 14.  Alan Beardsworth & Teresa Keil, The Vegetarian Option: Varieties, 
Conversions, Motives and Careers, 40 SOC. REV. 253, 261 (1992).  
 15.  Leo A. Goodman, Snowball Sampling, 32 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICAL 
STAT. 148, 148 (1961).  
 16.  Id. 
 17.  See Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 316–19 (describing the process 
the authors used to identify survey participants).  
 18.  Id. at 373.  
 19.  Id. at 317. 
 20.  Id. 
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all Virginia prosecutors).21 In other words, 34%, or more than a 
third of the participants, withdrew from the survey before 
completion. We are given no explanation as to why; nor do the 
authors explain whether their survey, the types of questions, the 
length of the survey, the format, or technical issues prevented a 
significant portion of the respondents from responding. Perhaps 
the survey asked questions that were impossible to answer.   
In North Carolina, the numbers were even lower—only 
11.5% of prosecutors answered the survey and, again, the authors 
made no effort to make sure their sample was representative.22 It 
appears that the authors were merely interested in having some 
data, rather than in the quality of that data.  
For defense attorneys, the numbers are just as low. 30% of 
the Virginia private defense counsel who initially responded 
failed to complete the survey.23 Only 14.2% of all private defense 
counsel invited to participate actually participated.24 In North 
Carolina, only forty-three of the 284 Public Defenders in the state 
responded to the survey.25 Only 7.5% of private counsel responded 
to the survey.26   
The low response rates suggest survey flaws but the authors 
don’t seem to accept that explanation. For example, the authors 
attempt to explain why they could not find more data on formal 
and informal “discovery waiver” (another undefined term).27 
Rather than admit that their sample was non-representative and 
therefore invalid, they simply claim “it is likely that discovery 
waivers—whether formal or informal—are indeed rare.”28 
However, the authors’ conclusion runs counter to the conclusion 
reached by the U.S. Supreme Court that such waivers are an 
integral part of the plea bargaining process, especially in 
narcotics distribution cases.29  
                                                                                                     
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id. at 318.  
 23.  Id. at 321. 
 24.  Id. at 318.  
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id. at 321.  
 27.  See id. at 346–52 (discussing discovery waivers and the failed 
expectation that they would be more common in open-file jurisdictions).  
 28.  Id. at 351. 
 29.  See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 632 (2002) (noting that the 
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The problem is not merely the number of respondents but the 
fact that the authors never assured that their respondents were 
actually representative of their state. 69% of all Virginia 
prosecutors’ offices did not participate in the survey.30 If all of 
those offices engaged in discovery waivers, the quality of the data 
would be radically different. In addition, the survey failed to 
represent offices by size and by rural versus suburban versus 
urban, which the authors admit.31 
The authors acknowledge that their sample is “non-
representative” of attorneys in Virginia and North Carolina.32 At 
that point, the question of whether the survey is valid should 
have been over. However, the authors insist that because their 
respondents share the same general demographic characteristics 
of attorneys in Virginia and North Carolina (race, gender, and 
years of experience), it is appropriate to draw conclusions about 
the respondents to the survey.33  There is no factual basis for that 
conclusion.   
D. Similarity of Virginia and North Carolina 
The authors state that they “chose Virginia and North 
Carolina because they are geographically close and have 
populations of similar size.”34 That is true but one would think 
that it would be far more important to find states that are legally 
similar but for their discovery rules. 
As the article points out, Virginia has 120 elected 
prosecutors; North Carolina has forty-four.35 This disparity in 
                                                                                                     
Government relies on plea bargaining to resolve 90% of its criminal cases).  
 30. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (stating that only thirty-
seven of the 120 Virginia prosecutor offices responded to the survey). 
 31.  See Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 376 (“One feature we did not 
consider is the size of offices (and related to this, whether offices were in rural or 
urban areas).”). 
 32.  Id. at 321.  
 33.  Id. at 319–20.   
 34.  Id. at 316. The two states share a 300+ mile border and have 
approximate populations of 8.4 million and 10 million respectively. Population 
of Virginia in 2016, POPULATION 2016 (Jan. 13, 2016), 
http://population2016.com/population-of-virginia-in-2016.html (last visited Aug. 
29, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 35.  Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 317.  
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numbers exists because Virginia is unique amongst the states—
cities are independent and not part of any county. In Virginia, 
judges are selected by the legislature,36 parole has been 
abolished,37 juries decide sentences as well as guilt,38 jury trials 
are bifurcated between the guilt phase and the sentencing phase 
with prior criminal records being provided in the latter phase,39 
and bench trials replace jury trials if both the defendant and the 
Commonwealth waive.40 In North Carolina, judges are elected 
directly by citizens,41 there is a modified parole system,42 there is 
judge but not jury sentencing,43 and the state constitution was 
only just recently amended to allow defendants (but not the 
State) to waive a jury trial.44  
Perhaps one of these differences, or a synergy between 
several of these differences, has a far more profound impact on 
the criminal justice systems in these states than different rules of 
discovery. Unfortunately, the authors do not address the impact 
of these differences. 
E. Failure to Define Terms 
1. “Discovery” and “Exculpatory Evidence” 
The article uses these terms interchangeably but we know 
they have different meanings. A criminal defendant’s “right to 
receive from prosecutors exculpatory evidence material is a right 
that the Constitution provides as part of its basic fair trial 
guarantee.”45  But at the same time, “[t]here is no general 
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case.”46 
                                                                                                     
 36.  VA. CONST., art. VI, § 7.  
 37.  VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-165.1. 
 38.  VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  See generally Wright v. Commonwealth, 357 S.E.2d 547 (Va. 1987).  
 41.  N.C. CONST., art. IV, § 16.  
 42.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-81B.  
 43.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-81. 
 44.  N.C. CONST., art. I, § 24.  
 45.  United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002) (citing Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 46.  Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977). 
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In addition, the article does not differentiate between a 
prosecutor’s constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence 
and his ethical duty under the Rule 3.8 equivalent of his state’s 
Code of Professional Conduct.47 There are significant differences 
between each concerning the timing of the disclosure and the 
extent of responsibility for vicarious knowledge. 
2. “Open File” 
The article compares Virginia and North Carolina discovery 
practices with particular focus on “open file” discovery.48 But the 
article never tells us what is meant by “open file” discovery. It 
could mean that the file is handed over to defense counsel with no 
redactions. It could mean that the file is handed over to defense 
counsel with redactions of witness personal identifying 
information, like social security numbers or mobile phone 
numbers. It could mean that the file is handed over to defense 
counsel with redactions of the identity of undercover officers or 
cooperating informants. It could mean that defense counsel is 
allowed to merely inspect the file. It could mean the prosecutor 
makes and sends to defense counsel a separate copy of the file.   
The article fails to define the term “open file” discovery and 
with good reason: because there are so many versions of “open 
file” policies, conducting a general survey that takes those 
differences into account would have been a herculean task. 
Rather than separating survey results by jurisdiction according 
to what kind of “open file” policy was in place, the survey instead 
lumps Virginia jurisdictions into two categories: “open file” and 
“closed file.”49   
This failure to define terms becomes important when the 
authors reveal that North Carolina does not do “open file” 
discovery for misdemeanors at all.50 In addition, there is no right 
                                                                                                     
 47.  VA. SUP. CT. R. PT 6 2 RPC 8.3. 
 48. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 286 (noting the different 
approaches to discovery employed by North Carolina and Virginia). 
 49.  In fact, the Justice & Professionalism Committee of the Virginia 
Association of Commonwealth’s Attorneys has just begun compiling what 
material is disclosed by the various Virginia offices that do “open file “discovery. 
 50.  See Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 378 n.377 (referencing a case 
and an article both affirming the superior court original jurisdiction 
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to discovery in district court at all and the right to “open file” only 
begins if a case has original jurisdiction in superior court.51 If a 
case is resolved in district court, the defendant never has a right 
to discover at all.   
However, many Virginia jurisdictions have “open file” 
policies that include misdemeanors and felonies that are pending 
in district court. In that way, Virginia discovery can be far 
broader than North Carolina discovery because a substantial 
number of felony cases are resolved in district court and 
defendants have a discovery right in district court.52 This fact 
should have been a significant discussion in the survey and in the 
article, but instead is given only a footnote.   
3. “Turn Over” 
The article also fails to define the term “turn over.” For 
example, it compares Virginia and North Carolina on whether the 
government must “turn over” a search warrant. In Virginia, a 
search warrant and its affidavit are public records per se without 
any action or participation by the prosecutor unless the 
prosecutor obtains special permission to temporarily seal the 
warrant and affidavit.53 The answer, therefore, for all Virginia 
jurisdictions should be that prosecutors always “turn over” search 
warrants and affidavits. However, the authors’ survey reports 
46.2% of Virginia prosecutors answer “never” or “sometimes.”54   
“Turn over” is also confusing in this survey because it 
conflates putting a document in a file with assuring that defense 
counsel actually looks at or receives the document. It has been my 
experience over the years that defense counsel often misses the 
significance of particular material (or perhaps do not read it at 
all) contained in the discovery file and then later claim that it 
was never disclosed.  
In addition, does “turn over” mean producing a document 
itself or the information contained therein? According to the 
                                                                                                     
requirement for the North Carolina open file discovery rule to apply). 
 51.    Id. 
 52.  VA. SUP. CT. R. 7C:5; VA. SUP. CT. R. 8:15. 
 53.  VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-54.  
 54.  Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 323. 
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survey, 3.7% of Virginia defense counsel report that prosecutors 
“never” turn over a defendant’s criminal record, with a further 
13.2% reporting “sometimes.” Because this result is completely 
contrary to existing Virginia law, it is unclear what the 
respondents possibly could have meant. It could mean they did 
not receive the actual printout from the state and national police 
databases55 but only received a written summary from the 
prosecutor. 
F. Apparent Bias 
Repeatedly, when their data was in conflict, the authors 
suggest that prosecutors provided misleading responses and 
therefore discount some of the data collected by their survey. The 
authors, however, never make similar accusations of defense 
counsel. That suggests to us that the authors carry an inherent 
bias. 
One instance where the authors suggest prosecutors are 
misleading is when the survey data fell into conflict regarding 
whether prosecutors disclose Brady evidence.56 The authors write 
that, in light of the fact that their survey coincided with public 
debate over discovery reform in Virginia, “consciously or 
unconsciously, some Virginia prosecutors may have been eager to 
show that they are disclosing Brady material at high rates and 
that there is no pressing need for reforming the rules.”57 
However, the authors never, at any point, consider that 
defense counsel might have consciously or unconsciously been 
eager to show that they are not receiving Brady material in an 
effort to demonstrate a pressing need to reform the rules. That 
suggests that the authors conclude only prosecutors are prone to 
falsify answers for political gain.   
The authors demonstrate a predetermined bias in favor of 
their proposed hypothesis to the exclusion of any contradictory 
                                                                                                     
 55. These databases are the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) 
and Virginia Criminal Information Center (VCIN). 
 56. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 331 (acknowledging the 
unexpectedly different results of prosecutors from Virginia). 
 57.  Id. at 337. 
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data.58 For example, the authors attempt to explain away data 
that is contradictory and claim it supports their hypothesis.59 In 
North Carolina, prosecutors reported significantly lower rates of 
disclosure than Virginia prosecutors. However, in North 
Carolina, defense attorneys reported significantly higher rates of 
disclosure than Virginia defense attorneys.60 Thus, the data could 
support either of two conclusions—that the authors’ hypothesis is 
correct or that it is incorrect. Instead, the authors decided to 
conclude that the defenders were accurate in their responses and 
the prosecutors were inaccurate, and the authors found that the 
data supported their conclusion “that open-file discovery produces 
more consistent disclosure of Brady material.”61   
Most shockingly, the authors openly dismiss reports from 
prosecutors as being false.62 The authors conclude that “open-file 
discovery does not increase the risk of witness intimidation.”63 
However, Virginia and North Carolina prosecutors detail several 
concrete, factual instances where open-file discovery actually 
endangered witnesses.64 In one instance, a prosecutor described 
how information provided in open-file discovery led to the murder 
of a witness and the witness’s wife.65 The authors apparently 
dismiss these reports as being inaccurate.   
Since the authors are not practicing lawyers and have no 
experience in law enforcement, their apparent bias causes them 
to make similarly biased conclusions that are not based in fact or 
evidence. For example, when addressing “open file” discovery in 
misdemeanor cases, they allege “misdemeanor cases are less 
likely to raise issues of witness safety than felony cases.”66    
Many prosecutors and law enforcement officers, and probably 
defense counsel, would take issue with this blanket statement, 
                                                                                                     
 58. See id. at 331 (stating the hypothesis that “open file produces better 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence”). 
 59.  Id. at 331. 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id.  
 62. See infra Part II.C (discussing how victim and witness safety are 
important concerns in the open0file discovery). 
 63.  Id. at 360.  
 64.  Id. at 359–60.  
 65.  Id. at 359.  
 66.  Id. at 379 n. 378. 
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especially prosecutors who handle domestic and family violence 
cases.   
II. Thoughts on Where We Are and Where We Are Going 
As noted in the Article, on December 2, 2014, the Virginia 
Supreme Court Special Committee on Criminal Discovery Rules 
issued its report recommending “broader and earlier discovery.”67 
I happened to serve on that committee. The twenty-nine-member 
committee consisted of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, 
and others involved throughout the criminal justice system. 
Unfortunately, at no point during the committee meetings was 
there ever any discussion whether rules modifications in Virginia 
were necessary in the first place. 
On November 13, 2015, the Virginia Supreme Court issued 
the following order: 
On December 2, 2014 came the Special Committee on Criminal 
Discovery Rules and submitted its final report, which included 
proposed revisions to [the rules of criminal discovery]. Having 
considered the Committee’s report and the public comments 
submitted in response thereto, the Court declines to adopt the 
Committee’s recommendations.68 
A few days later, Chief Justice Donald Lemons told the Richmond 
Times-Dispatch that a “more incremental approach would be 
more palatable to the Court.” 69 He also said that it was:  
[A]pparent that the proposals are the result of ‘trade-offs’ in 
the negotiations between interest groups. It would be difficult 
for the Court to accept some of the proposals and not all of 
them as a package because the Court cannot be certain about 
the interdependent nature of the compromises.70 
                                                                                                     
 67.  Id. at 337, n. 210. 
 68.  Frank Green, Justices Reject Recommendations on Pretrial Discovery in 
Criminal Cases, RICHMOND TIMES (Nov. 26, 2015), 
http://www.richmond.com/news/article_a7518ce0-3e7c-5696-8cc2-
0dda708dd9b1.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2016) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). The order is available online at 
http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendments/2015_1113_discovery_orde
r.pdf.  
 69.  Green, supra note 68. 
 70.  Id. 
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Having engaged in those negotiations, let me comment on some of 
my basic considerations during the process. 
A. Distinguishing Discovery from Exculpatory Evidence  
From the start, it is absolutely critical to distinguish between 
statute/rule-based discovery and constitutionally-mandated 
exculpatory evidence. “Brady is ‘a disclosure rule, not a discovery 
rule.’ Indeed, ‘[t]here is no general constitutional right to 
discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one.’”71   
Unfortunately, far too often these terms are used 
interchangeably. During the dialogue of the past few years, 
proponents of modifying Virginia’s discovery rules have cited 
examples of wrongful convictions allegedly gained by discovery 
rule violations. When pressed for specific examples, they 
invariably cite cases where the violation was a failure to disclose 
exculpatory evidence. For that reason, I concluded that these 
were “discovery” answers in search of an “exculpatory evidence” 
problem. 
Please do not misunderstand me. I am as opposed to 
wrongful convictions based on exculpatory evidence violations as 
anyone. But I find it odd that these proponents are arguing for a 
change to Rule 3A:11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of 
Virginia to mandate the disclosure of evidence which the Bill of 
Rights already guarantees. It is almost as if they are saying the 
Rule is more important than the Constitution. 
For this reason, I disagreed with the Committee’s conclusion 
that a new subsection requiring the disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence should have been added to Rule 3A:11 dealing with 
criminal discovery. The Bill of Rights already requires that a 
prosecutor disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defense 
“in time for it to be used effectively by the defendant.”72 Rule 
3.8(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct already requires that 
a prosecutor “make timely disclosure . . . of the existence of 
evidence which the prosecutor knows tends to negate the guilt of 
                                                                                                     
 71.  Commonwealth v. Tuma, 740 S.E.2d 14, 18 (Va. 2013) (citations 
omitted). 
 72.  Bramblett v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 400, 409 (Va. 1999).   
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the accused.”73 At best, the new subsection would have been 
redundant; at worst, the timing of the disclosure ran contrary to 
the Constitution and the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
B. Avoiding Trial by Ambush through Reciprocity 
The aim of trials is to find the truth. Uncovering the truth is 
the paramount goal of the adversary system. All the rules of 
decorum, ethics, and procedure are meant to aid the truth-
finding process. Ambush, trickery, stealth, gamesmanship, 
one-upmanship, surprise have no legitimate role to play in a 
properly conducted trial. This is so whether the gamesman is 
the defendant or the Commonwealth.74   
If there is any justification for modifying the discovery 
requirements of Rule 3A:11, it should be to uncover the truth and 
avoid “trial by ambush.” That goes for both the prosecution and 
the defense. For this reason, I advocated in the Committee for as 
much reciprocal discovery as is constitutionally permitted.   
I realized that under the proposed rule change the 
prosecution would be disclosing far more non-expert material 
than the defense. But I also realized that the prosecution 
probably has a lot more information in its file than the defense 
has. The proposed changes would have gone a long way towards 
promoting the truth-finding function of trial, especially in the 
areas of expert testimony and witness lists. 
C. Safeguarding Personal Information of Victims and Witnesses 
Of grave concern to the prosecutors and law enforcement 
officials on the Committee was how to provide enhanced 
discovery while safeguarding personal information about victims 
and witnesses to crimes. This problem has grown in significance 
over the past few years as the availability of personal digital 
devices has grown exponentially. 
For a long time, a significant number of prosecutors in the 
Commonwealth have complied with their duty to disclose 
                                                                                                     
 73.  VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d).  
 74.  Bennett v. Commonwealth, 374 S.E.2d 303, 311 (Va. 1988). 
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exculpatory evidence and discovery through an informal “open 
file” policy. Under this policy, defense counsel is free to come to 
the prosecutor’s office to read and review the contents of the 
prosecution file but is not given a separate hard copy of that file 
to take back to the defendant. Counsel is free to make all the 
notes they wanted and, in some instances, dictate relevant 
portions of the file for subsequent transcription by counsel’s legal 
assistant. There was little opportunity for abuse as counsel would 
seldom take the extra time needed to record information such as 
social security numbers, home addresses, or mobile phone 
numbers. 
That opportunity for abuse all changed with the advent of 
“smart” technology and Internet social media. With such 
technology, the prosecution file could be scanned or photographed 
in its entirety. The file then walked out of the prosecutor’s office 
along with defense counsel.  Absent agreements such as those 
discussed in Legal Ethics Opinion 1864,75 this digital file 
belonged to the defendant—if not before trial then certainly at 
the termination of the representation.76 Exact copies of police 
reports with witnesses’ names, addresses, telephone numbers, 
social security numbers, and other personal information came 
directly into the hands of criminal defendants. Many of these 
defendants have no qualms about posting these police reports on 
Facebook or other social media, hoping to intimidate witnesses 
from cooperating with law enforcement now or in the future. 
With this danger in mind, the prosecutors and law 
enforcement officials on the Committee insisted that victim and 
witness safety had to be a central facet of any proposed rule 
change. For this reason, a new subsection to Rule 3A:11 was 
proposed. The proposal would have allowed the party in 
possession of sensitive information to redact it before the 
issuance of any court order to do so. The party wishing to receive 
such information would then need to file a motion in court. The 
thought here was one of long-term judicial economy; within a 
short period of time, both prosecutors and defense counsel would 
                                                                                                     
 75.    See VA. ST. B. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL ETHICS, LEGAL ETHICS OPINION 
1864 (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.vsb.org/docs/LEO/1864.pdf (considering the 
legality of a defense attorney agreeing not to provide certain information about 
witnesses to his or her client). 
 76.  VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(e).   
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have a good idea what information a court would and would not 
order disclosed and the number of motions would go down.77 
However, not all law enforcement officials felt that the 
proposed subsection provided adequate protection. Thus, the only 
minority report attached to the Committee’s report dealt with 
this topic. 
D. Minimizing Costs, Burdens, and Delays 
This was my most significant concern during the committee 
deliberation process. The changes proposed to Rule 3A:11 would 
have significantly added time and financial burdens to all 
prosecutors’ offices. It would be one thing if each prosecutor in 
the Commonwealth carried only one felony prosecution at a time; 
it is a totally different prospect when you consider the reality 
that, nationally, most prosecutors carry caseloads of 100–200 
felonies at a time.78     
Even without a change to Rule 3A:11, prosecutors are facing 
greatly increasing discovery demands. With modern technology, 
law enforcement generates far greater discoverable information. 
Dash-mounted camera video, body worn camera video, and 
jailhouse telephone audio are just a few examples of this new 
technology. One individual traffic stop could generate several 
hours of video and audio evidence. 
When you added the impact of the proposed changes, 
workload and financial costs would have gone up dramatically. In 
order to redact the protected personal information contained in 
paper reports, a prosecutor would have to make a photocopy of 
every page of every report. Every page with protected material 
would then need to be marked out with a felt-tip marker. In order 
to keep this information protected from someone who will simply 
hold that page up to a light bulb, the prosecutor would then need 
                                                                                                     
 77.  See SUPREME COURT OF VA., REP. OF THE SPEC. COMM. ON CRIMINAL 
DISCOVERY RULES TO THE CHIEF JUSTICES & JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
VA. MINORITY COMMENTS 55–56 (Dec. 2, 2014) (discussing the intimidation of 
witnesses and costs associated with reforms). 
 78.  See generally Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State 
(Never) Rests: How Excessive Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. 
L. REV. 261 (2011) (noting the incredibly large case load prosecutors have to 
handle). 
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to make a second photocopy of that redacted page. The huge costs 
in paper, ink cartridges, and felt-tip pens would pale in 
comparison to the personnel expenses associated with the time 
involved. 
If we are going to expand the scope of criminal discovery in 
Virginia, we have to find the proper time and resource-efficient 
method to get this information from law enforcement and see that 
all properly discoverable information is delivered to defense 
counsel in a timely fashion. Otherwise, we will need to drastically 
modify our criminal justice process, potentially plea- bargaining a 
greater number of cases just to keep the criminal dockets 
manageable.79 
That resource-efficient method is digital prosecutorial case-
management systems. These systems would need to be 
compatible with law enforcement record management and 
evidence systems. A prosecutor sitting at a desk could quickly 
retrieve case history reports and law enforcement evidence. The 
reports could be quickly read for sensitive information and a 
digital copy created with such information redacted by a “click” 
and “drag.” The digital file appropriate for discovery could then 
be electronically transmitted to defense counsel with a digital 
record or receipt of exactly what information was transmitted and 
when. No paper, no ink cartridges, and theoretically no traveling 
to or from the office would be needed in order to provide or 
receive discovery. 
The problem is that currently very few prosecutors have such 
a case-management system and the costs of such systems are 
prohibitive for many offices. The Executive Summary of the 
Committee’s Report highlighted how crucial electronic or “e-
discovery” would be to the Committee’s proposal and advocated 
not only for a “statewide standard for filing and storage of case 
information,” but that any such effort should “make 
accommodation to allow for existing investments in technology.”80  
Finally, let me conclude by stressing the Committee’s final 
thoughts on the subject from its Executive Summary. “It is 
                                                                                                     
 79.  This is why the discussion in Part I.D of the legal dissimilarities 
between Virginia and North Carolina is critical. 
 80.  SUPREME COURT OF VA., REP. OF THE SPEC. COMM. ON CRIMINAL 
DISCOVERY RULES TO THE CHIEF JUSTICES & JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
VA., at vi (Dec. 2, 2014).  
 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 415 (2016) 432 
emphasized that use of electronic document management is a key 
to avoiding unnecessary costs, burdens and delays, as well as to 
avoid misuse or abuse resulting from providing the accused or the 
public inadvertent access to sensitive material.”81 
III. Conclusion 
We are sympathetic to the authors’ plight. They wanted to 
collect statewide data from two diverse and complicated 
jurisdictions, Virginia and North Carolina, and collect it from 
busy attorneys who have little free time to help a couple of 
professors who are curious about the actual practice of law. The 
authors are clearly devoted to their hypothesis and firmly believe 
it to be true. That does not, however, make their conclusions 
valid, especially when based on unrepresentative samples and 
unjustified interpretations of data. 
As Chief Justice Lemons said, changes, if they are going to 
come, are going to come incrementally in Virginia.82 Advents in 
technology, especially electronic discovery, will help ease that 
incremental process. 
                                                                                                     
 81.  Id. 
 82.  See Green, supra note 68 (“Justice Donald W. Lemons said he did not 
presume to speak for the other justices, but he felt that a more incremental 
approach would be more palatable to the court.”).  
